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Introduction 
 
One of the concepts that many group therapists use to make sense of what is going on in a 
therapy group is that of the ‘group-as-a-whole’. A number of other terms are used to 
signify a similar idea. For example, some talk about the group as a supra-personal 
network, a living system, a matrix, a psychic apparatus, or a group mind. They talk about 
the group as being more than the sum of its parts, the individuals, who compose it. Group 
forces are said to impact on individuals and the group itself is said to have moods of its 
own and to speak through its members. People are sometimes said to be acting out some 
role on behalf of the group. All of these formulations, therefore, postulate an entity that is 
outside of, at a higher level than, individuals and there is a tendency to reify, 
anthropomorphise and mystify this entity, even when it is held to be an illusion rather 
than a reality. This entity is understood to be unconsciously constituted by individual 
intrapsychic processes of projection, projective identification, introjection, identification 
and splitting. The entity created in this way is then assumed to act back on its individual 
members as the unconscious cause of their actions. What is being postulated, therefore, is 
a metaphysics of human action, that is, a hidden reality beyond, above or behind 
appearances of the phenomena in question. This hidden reality is then understood as the 
cause of human action. 
 
The effect of this hidden reality is frequently held to be the regression of individuals to 
infantile, primitive states of dependency and aggression. It is often assumed that, in a 
group, individuality is lost, contact with reality severed and task performance destroyed, 
unless anxiety can be contained by some form of organisation, or by the skill, often 
interpretive skill, of the therapist. This view leads to a practice in which the therapist may 
interpret the actions of the ‘group-as-a-whole’ so that through awareness of what is 
happening to them individuals can free themselves of the group’s unconscious causal 
powers and so act more independently, autonomously and rationally as individuals. 
 
In this paper, I seek to draw out the, often implicit, assumptions upon which this way of 
thinking is built and contrast it with an argument that takes seriously Foulkes’ (1948) 
dictum that the individual is social through and through. I present an argument that seeks 
to hold rigorously to the view that individuals are always interdependent, never 
autonomous, and that, therefore, selves are social selves. Far from being lost, 
individuality is always constituted in a group. If one takes this perspective then there is 
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no place for the notion of the ‘group-as-a-whole’ as an explanation of human action. 
Instead, rather than postulating a hidden reality, one focuses attention on the phenomena 
of human interaction, that is, on the thematic patterning of relationships between people 
in a group, noticing how that patterning is formed by them and at the same time forms 
them. The causal explanation of interaction is then in terms of the interactions themselves 
rather than some ‘thing’ beyond, above or behind them. I argue that this shift in the focus 
of attention has important implications for therapeutic practice. 
 
I first provide a brief description of the notion of the ‘group-as-a-whole’ and then, 
because of the constraints of a short paper, I give a necessarily condensed description of 
the theory of complex responsive processes (Stacey, Griffin & Shaw, 2000; Stacey, 2001; 
Griffin, 2001; Shaw, 2002; Stacey, 2003), which is a theory of social selves. After that, I 
explore the way in which the perspective of complex responsive processes provides an 
alternative explanation of human interaction compared to the notion of the ‘group-as-a-
whole’ with. 
 
 
The ‘group-as-a-whole’ from the perspectives of 
psychoanalysis and group analysis 
 
Throughout his writing on the individual and the group, between 1908 and 1930, Freud 
(1908; 1913; 1921; 1927; 1930) consistently made a number of fundamental assumptions 
about the relationship between them (see Stacey (2003) for a fuller development). First, 
the individual psyche is an internal world of object representations and the group / the 
social is an entity external to the individual. Second, the psychology of this external 
entity, the group / the social, can be explained in terms of the psychology of the 
individual. Group behaviour recapitulates the individual oedipal situation, just as that 
individual oedipal situation recapitulates a mythical overthrow of the primal leader and 
the introjection of his ideals. The group is the individual writ large, constructed by 
individual psychic processes of projection and introjection. Third, the formation of 
groups involves a regression to infantile and primitive states so that the individual is 
incapacitated by the group unless it can contain anxiety through forms of organisation 
such that individuals can remain autonomous, independent and rational. Fourth, the social 
is a constraint that is internalised as superego so that the relationship between the 
individual and the group is basically conflictual, a conflict that is dealt with 
intrapsychically in a dynamic in which ‘the unconscious’ is central.  Fifth, the internal 
world of the psyche is structured by the clash between individual instinct and the group. 
Freudian thinking is thus characterised by a duality of individual and group, an inside 
which is an individual internal world consisting of object representations and 
unconscious psychic processes, and an outside which is a group entity created by the 
individual intrapsychic processes. Communication between individuals in a group takes 
the form of transmission of mental contents in processes of identification, projection and 
introjection.  
 
These fundamental assumptions have had a continuing effect on the development of 
psychoanalytic thinking about the group. Klein (1988) retained Freud’s central 
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assumptions of internal worlds communicating with each other using mechanisms of 
transmitting and receiving and she greatly elaborated them in pre-oedipal terms. Bion 
(1961) developed these intrapsychic notions into a theory of group functioning, where 
individuals coming together in a group anonymously and unconsciously contribute 
mental contents to the group. The group itself is an illusion formed in the internal worlds 
of the individuals constituting it through intrapsychic processes. Like Freud, Bion also 
thought of the group as a regressive phenomenon in which it is very difficult for 
individuals to function rationally and autonomously as a work group. Bion drew attention 
to particular universal defences employed in group life to defend against its innate 
anxieties, taking the form of the well-known basic assumptions. The group, then, 
recapitulates the infantile primitive defences of splitting, projection and projective 
identification of the internal world of the infant just as in Freud’ thought. Bion’s 
understanding of group life was considerably developed, from the 1940s on, by those 
working at the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations (for example, Miller & Rice, 
1967). They took Bion’s development of Klein’s view of the psyche as internal world, the 
inside, and combined it with a theory of the outside provided by general systems theory 
developed by the biologist von Bertlanffy (1968) in the period around the Second World 
War.  
 
Object relations theory and its combination with open systems thinking, therefore, 
elaborated Freud’s basic view of the group and its relationship with the individual. This 
elaboration has continued to exert an enormous influence on other psychoanalytic 
thinking about the individual and the group. For example, Anzieu (1984) regards groups 
as the consequence of individual projections. In their projective activity, individuals are 
said to create an overarching group psychical apparatus, often experienced as mother. 
Ezriel (1952) worked very much in the tradition of Bion and said that the group analytic 
task was to focus on the group as opposed to the individuals. He talked about individuals 
in a group driven by forces beyond their control as if the group had needs and exercised 
an agency quite apart from the individuals composing it. Whitaker (1985) also saw the 
group as a phenomenon existing at a different level to the individuals composing it. This 
phenomenon has special characteristics such as group moods, emotional contagion, 
shared themes, norms, beliefs and collusive defences. In Agazarian’s (1994b) systems-
centred approach to group therapy, the ‘group-as-a-whole’ is a system which develops 
from simple to complex by splitting into differentiating subgroups. In her system-centred 
group, the basic unit is the sub-group rather than the individual member and she talks 
about deliberately exploiting group forces. 
 
More recently relational and intersubjective psychoanalysts have been developing a more 
socially oriented form of psychoanalytic theory (e.g. Mitchell and Aron, 1999; Ogden, 
1994; Stolorow, Atwood & Brandchaft, 1994). They have made a significant move away 
from Freud’s metapsychology and his focus on intrapsychic phenomena. However, the 
notion of the internal world and the distinction between inside and outside remains a 
central feature of both theory and practice. The focus of practice is on the dyad and the 
theory is developed in terms of a dyad. What people create in their interaction is some 
kind of system, or third, external to them, quite consistent with the conceptualisations of 
individual and group of the writers mentioned above. 
 3
 
In some respects, Foulkes’ thinking about individual and the group has much in common 
with this psychoanalytic / systemic approach, but as Dalal (1998; 2001) has pointed out it 
also contains another, contradictory strand drawn from the thought of Elias (2000/1939). 
When arguing from the psychoanalytic / systemic perspective, Foulkes describes the 
group as a transpersonal, or supra personal network in which its members are equivalent 
to nodes and the whole, the group, is primary and prior to its parts, the individuals. He 
talks about the transpersonal network giving utterance through individual speakers 
(Foulkes, 1964). He describes the ‘group-as-a-whole’ as a living organism, a spirit, 
atmosphere, or climate, distinct from the individuals composing it, having moods and 
reactions (Foulkes, 1948 p140). According to Foulkes, then, when people come together 
in a group they create a new phenomenon, a suprapersonal psychic system, a matrix, 
which he describes as a hypothetical web of communication, a total unified field of 
mental happenings of which the individual is a part. 
 
This perspective outline so far in this section encourages the therapist to focus attention 
on collective unconscious fantasies about the group-as-a-whole, for example, that 
members are defensively experiencing the group as mother. One will try to understand 
such unconscious motivation in terms of regression to primitive states, constituted by 
intrapsychic processes of transference, projection, introjection and identification. In 
focusing attention in this way, the perspective distracts attention from the 
phenomenology of group interaction in the living present, encouraging instead a focus on 
early trauma and mother-infant relationships.  
 
Under the influence of Elias (2000/1939), however, Foulkes sometimes rejects the spatial 
notions of mind inside and group outside (Foulkes, 1948, p10/11) and says that mind lies 
in each individual’s need for communication and belonging. He regards language as one 
of the most important mental phenomena and this can only be maintained as a group 
phenomenon (Foulkes, 1990 p277/8). This strand in Foulkes’ thought can be summarised 
by his saying that the individual is social through and through. Foulkes emphasised the 
social processes of belonging and the therapeutic process as one of widening and 
deepening communication between group members. Here, Foulkes leaves behind the idea 
of the group as fundamentally regressive and sees it as fundamentally constitutive of the 
individual. He does not emphasise the destructive aspects of group interaction, indeed he 
may be said to have idealised the group (Nitsun, 1996) It seems to me that his practice 
was particularly consistent with this perspective, although he never consistently 
developed this social strand in his thinking. In a recent book, Complexity and Group 
Processes: a radically social understanding of the individual (2003), I have tried to 
develop this idea in relation to the therapy group, using what colleagues and I have called 
a complex responsive processes theory of human action. The next section provides a 
necessarily condensed summary of this perspective, indicating some questions it raise 
about therapeutic practice. 
 
 
Groups and individuals as complex responsive processes of relating 
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The theory of complex responsive processes draws on some analogies from the natural 
complexity sciences interpreted in the human sphere in accordance with the thought of 
George Herbert Mead (1934) and Norbert Elias (2000/1939). First, I give a brief 
indication of the key notions from the natural complexity sciences which provide useful 
analogies and then go on to interpret them as far as human action is concerned. 
 
 
The natural complexity sciences 
 
Those working in the natural complexity sciences seek to model the temporal movement 
of natural phenomena in terms of nonlinear interaction between the large numbers of 
entities comprising them. There are a number of strands in these sciences, for example, 
chaos theory (Gleick, 1988), dissipative structure theory (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984; 
Prigogine, 1997), synergetics (Kelso, 1995) and complex adaptive systems (Goodwin, 
1994; Kauffman, 1995, Waldorp, 1992). I will focus attention on the last mentioned. 
 
Complex adaptive systems consist of large numbers of entities, called agents, interacting 
with each other, adapting to each other, to produce overall order or coherence. For 
example, the human brain can be thought of as a complex adaptive system. It consists of 
100 million agents (neurons), each of which interacts with a limited number (up to 
30,000) of others. In firing electro-chemical energy, one neuron triggers the firing of 
others and is in turn triggered by the limited number of others it is connected to. In this 
sense each agent is acting locally. There is no overall blueprint, programme or plan 
determining the overall pattern, only the myriad local interactions between agents. The 
key question, then, is this: How does the overall order of coherent thought and action 
come about in this endless, iterative local interaction?  
 
What the studies of complex adaptive systems show is the possibilities and properties of 
local interaction. When the number of agents and the number and strength of the 
connections between them is large enough, the whole system displays patterns of 
movement that are stable and unstable at the same time, a dynamic referred to as ‘the 
edge of chaos’. The system is then not caught in a completely repetitive, stable pattern 
nor is it caught in an unstable, random pattern without any order but, rather, displays a 
paradoxical temporal movement of stability and instability at the same time. It is in this 
dynamic that the local interaction of agents, known as self organisation, yields overall 
order. That overall order has not been designed – it emerges without any blueprint or 
programme for the overall order itself. However, self organisation does not mean that 
each agent is free to do anything. This is because the requirement to interact imposes 
constraints on each agent and the more they are constrained by each other the more the 
constraints will conflict with each other. Order is sustained, then, not by some plan or 
blueprint for the whole but by the myriad conflicting constraints the agents impose on 
each other through the requirement that they interact. Furthermore, emergence does not 
mean that something ‘just’ happens. What emerges does so precisely because of how 
each agent is interacting, or not interacting, with other agents in their local situations. 
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The first of property of nonlinear relationships and iterative agent interactions, then, is 
that local interaction, that is self organisation, produces emergent widespread coherence. 
Local interaction is the cause of overall global order – they are facets of the same 
processes of interaction. The second property has to do with the paradoxical dynamic of 
simultaneous stability and instability, simultaneous predictability and unpredictability, 
displayed in patterns of local interaction and the global coherence that emerges from it. In 
other words, the implication is that iterative interaction between large numbers of highly 
connected, mutually constraining agents produces emergent overall coherent patterns 
which are unpredictable in important respects. 
 
The third property has to do with diversity. When the agents are all the same, 
homogeneous, then self organisation produces one overall pattern (Reynolds, 1987). 
While that pattern displays the paradoxical dynamic of stable instability, making it 
impossible to predict its detailed development, the system has no internal capacity to 
spontaneously move to a new pattern (Allen, 1998). It cannot display creativity, or 
evolve, because it is unfolding a general pattern already enfolded in it. However, when 
agents are diverse, the system does have the internal capacity to move spontaneously to 
completely new patterns, showing that the evolution of novel pattern is only possible 
where interacting agents are heterogeneous (Allen, 1998). These agents are iterating, that 
is, roughly repeating, their interactions with each other in each time period. However, 
since no iteration is exactly the same as another and since nonlinear interaction has the 
potential for amplifying small differences into completely different overall patterns, it 
follows that each iteration has the potential for transformation. Interaction is creating 
patterns of interaction which create further patterns of interaction and so on. We could 
call this transformative causality, a paradoxical causality of repetition and potential 
transformation at the same time, where interaction is patterning itself from within, as it 
were, without any outside casual agency.  In other words, evolution is occurring through 
the local interaction between diverse agents, that is, through self organisation rather than 
chance as in neo-Darwinian theories of evolution (Ray, 1992). The evolution of novel 
pattern is a movement into the unknown and thus radically unpredictable. In other words, 
the interaction of the agents is no longer unfolding that which is already enfolded but, 
rather, perpetually creating the future as both repetition and potential transformation at 
the same time. 
 
This means that any notion of a whole becomes quite problematic. There is no already 
existing whole being unfolded and the emerging overall pattern cannot be described as a 
whole because it is always evolving. One would need to talk about an ‘incomplete whole’ 
or ‘an absent whole’ (Bortoft, 1985) and it become increasingly unclear what is to be 
gained by doing this rather than dropping the whole notion of a ‘whole’. If the notion of a 
‘whole’ becomes problematic then so does the notion of ‘system’. System models where 
the agents are heterogeneous, in effect, take on an evolutionary path of their own. Since, 
the phenomena they are modelling are also evolving along unpredictable paths of their 
own, it is highly likely that model and reality will rapidly diverge. This creates a bit of a 
problem for the scientific modeller who at the very least has to give up the hope of 
prediction and focus on explanation and insight. For me, the complexity sciences are 
important because they point to this very different notion of causality. The complexity 
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sciences are important because, at least on one interpretation, they raise questions about 
the meaning of a ‘whole’ and challenge taken for granted notions of causality, pointing to 
a form of causality in which there are no causal agencies above, below or behind 
interaction itself. 
 
However, we need to avoid simply applying insights from the natural complexity 
sciences to human action if we are to avoid the confusion that has often been created in 
the past by taking notions from the natural sciences and simply applying them in the 
human sphere. For example, the notion of system has been imported from the natural 
sciences into theories of human action. However, the first systems thinker, Kant (1790), 
had argued against thinking of human action in terms of system because to do so is to 
deny human choice. A human cannot be thought of as a part of a system because a part 
only has meaning, as a part, if it fulfils the functioning of the system, not its own choices. 
However, Kant’s strictures have been widely ignored and the notion of system found in 
the natural sciences has been imported into the human sciences of psychology, sociology, 
economics, and political and organisational theory. The notion of the ‘group-as-a-whole 
is a reflection of this. Instead of directly importing notions from the complexity sciences, 
we need to treat them as a source domain for analogies with human action and in taking 
an analogy from one domain to another we have to add the attributes of the new domain.  
 
The theory of complex responsive processes avoids thinking of human action in terms of 
systems for the reasons given above and focuses attention, instead, on direct human 
interaction. It seeks to understand the interaction between living bodies, characterised by 
consciousness, self-consciousness, the capacity for choosing, and the emotional need for 
each other. Such interaction is understood primarily in terms of the pragmatist sociology 
of George Herbert Mead (1934) and the process sociology of Norbert Elias (2000/1939), 
both of whom argue in the tradition of Hegel (1807). They provide explanations of 
human interaction which resonate strongly with the notions of self organisation and 
emergence to be found in the complexity sciences. In taking this perspective, we move 
fro speaking about complex adaptive systems to complex responsive processes of relating 
between human bodies. 
 
Why might be the consequences for therapeutic practice? In moving to this perspective, 
the therapist’s attention is shifted from an hypothesised hidden reality to the phenomena 
of human relationships themselves, to the patterns of interaction between people. We 
become concerned with the evolving pattern of relationships between people in the group 
in the present, particularly those aspects of which we are not conscious (for a 
development of how unconscious processes are thought about from this perspective see 
Stacey, 2005).  A shift in perspective also provokes a rather different understanding of 
one’s role as therapist. I will be commenting further on both of these aspects below. 
 
The perspective of complex responsive processes is a theory of human experience which 
has a number of distinctive features. First, it is an action theory. It presents an 
understanding of human psychology and sociology in terms of the patterns of interaction 
between interdependent human bodies. Second, it is a temporal process theory that avoids 
the spatial metaphors of inside and outside and so avoids thinking about human action in 
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terms of internal worlds and external systems. Third, it is an evolutionary theory. I will 
briefly explain what I mean by each of these points, starting with the third. 
 
 
The physiological basis of attachment and separation 
 
A fundamental proposition of the theory of experience being presented here is that 
biological evolution has produced human bodies which need other human bodies, not as 
objects of drive discharge, but in a basic physiological sense. There is evidence to suggest 
that the human body requires attachment to and separation from other human bodies in 
order to regulate itself (Smith & Stevens, 1999). The human brain is excited, and this 
involves anxiety too, by the release of arousal hormones and calmed by the release of 
opioids. The two are linked to each other in that the release of arousal hormones tends to 
inhibit the release of opioids and vice versa.  Furthermore, attachment to other human 
bodies triggers the release of opioids while separation from others triggers the release of 
arousal hormones. Together, attachment and separation behaviour, and opioid and arousal 
hormone release, constitute what Smith calls a hyper-cycle. An infant body requires 
attachment to, and separation from, others in order to sustain itself in a state that is 
neither too aroused / anxious nor too inactive / placid. Subsequent psychological 
maturation enables a person to perform much of the necessary attachment-separation on 
his or her own but never completely. In a real sense, then, biological evolution has 
produced social bodies. I would add that it is more complex than this because attachment 
to a feared or sexually desired other can be highly arousing, while separation from them 
could be very calming. However, the important idea of the complex, iterative link 
between the physiological and the social remains.   
 
Furthermore, it is now well established that the great majority of the neuronal 
connections in the human brain are not present at birth but develop through subsequent 
experience and continue to change throughout life (Schore, 1994). Here again attachment 
and separation are fundamental, as indicated by studies showing that early traumas in 
relationships affect the formation of brain connections (Siegal, 1999). This brain 
plasticity means that biological evolution has produced human bodies characterised by a 
break in the rigid link between instinct and behaviour which is characteristic of other 
mammals. Elias (1989) pointed to the very small number of what he called species 
specific symbols in human action such as smiling, laughing and the categorical emotions. 
He argued that humans feel and act in ways that are little influenced by instinct, being 
shaped, instead, by social / cultural evolution. Even the expression of desire, and the 
desire to desire, is shaped by social interaction. 
 
Complex responsive processes theory, then, is an evolutionary theory of human 
experience where what is evolving is the thematic patterning of interaction between 
interdependent people, that is, the social and individual identity at the same time, where 
that interdependence has a physiological foundation.  This immediately establishes a 
radical difference, meaning a difference at its very roots, between this theory and 
psychoanalysis, evolutionary psychology (Gilbert & Bailey, 2000) and socio-biology 
(Wilson, 1992). All of the latter posit a strong link between instinct and human behaviour 
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and this leads to a view of the individual as biologically autonomous and usually 
fundamentally at odds with the social, which is seen as a constraint on the expression of 
the individual’s instincts. In the theory of complex responsive processes, individuals are 
in no sense autonomous since their physiological regulation and brain development 
requires social interaction and their very identities are constituted in social processes. 
However, although individuals are not autonomous, they are unique because of their 
different histories of social interaction. Clearly, as a practitioner, if one moves from the 
psychoanalytic-systemic perspective to that of complex responsive process, one is less 
likely to focus on regression, on the individual or on the mother-infant relationship. 
Instead, one is more likely to focus on the thematic patterning of relationships between 
members in the living present and their connection to wider social patterns of relating, 
such as culture and class.  
 
 
Power relations 
 
In setting out the way in which the theory of complex responsive processes is an 
evolutionary theory, I have been pointing to how it is also an action theory of experience. 
I now want to develop this aspect. If one argues that human bodies need each other at a 
basic physiological level, one is immediately arguing that power is fundamental to human 
relating. This is because, in their interaction, human bodies are enabling and constraining 
each other at the same time and this is what power means. Furthermore, the need one 
person has of another is highly unlikely to be equal to the need that this other person has 
of him or her. Elias (2000/1939) argued very persuasively that power is a characteristic of 
all human relating and that, given unequal needs or desires, the power ratio is inevitably 
titled towards some and against others. He pointed to how patterns, or figurations, of 
power relations emerge in the interaction between people as they form groups and how 
these figurations evolve with changing needs and desires. 
 
Elias (Elias & Scotson, 1994/1965) made very careful studies of how the formation of 
such figurations inevitably involved inclusion and exclusion. It is through inclusion in 
this group and exclusion from that group that each of us acquires our ‘We’ identity and 
this is inseparable from our ‘I’ identity.  We have a fundamental need to belong to 
groups, to be recognised and loved by others, for without this we have no identity or self. 
In other words, individual selves are formed in processes of power relating, the social, 
while at the same time they are forming those patterns of power relations. However, acts 
of inclusion immediately involve acts of exclusion. ‘We’ identity arises just as much 
from the groups we are excluded from as it does from the ones we are included in. ‘We’ 
identity, therefore, immediately involves assertions and feelings of ‘us’ and ‘them’, an 
expression of ideology which is reinforced by gossip and unconsciously sustains the 
power ratio between groups. This ideologically based power ratio is sustained by 
homogenisation within a group and by emphasising difference between groups (Dalal, 
1998; 2002) and is often expressed as idealisation of one’s own group and denigration, 
rejection and hatred of other groups. 
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Threats of exclusion from one’s own groups, and threats to the integrity of such groups 
posed by new entrants, are threats to identity, and such threats, therefore, provoke deep 
existential anxiety, triggering hatred and aggression. The perspective I am suggesting, 
therefore, sees love and hatred, dependence and independence, cooperation and 
competition / aggression as paradoxical aspects of the processes of social and self 
formation. There is then no need to think of groups as constituted by intrapsychic 
processes or as fundamentally regressive to infantile and primitive states. In terms of 
practice, the group therapist is therefore likely to focus on, and draw attention to, patterns 
of inclusion and exclusion, as well as the formation of, and threats to identity, all in the 
living present of the group in the wider social context. Note that the living present 
encompasses accounts of the past forming and being formed by expectations for the 
future as the basis of action in the present. This perfective encourages therapist to reflect 
upon their own position in the figurations of power in the group and the wider society, as 
well as the impact on their own ‘We’ identities, and the impact this has on their 
participation in the group.  
 
What I am suggesting, then, is a dialectical theory of human experience, in Hegel’s sense, 
in which the physiological, that is, the opposition of attachment and separation, is 
transformed as the psychological / sociological, namely, the opposition of enabling and 
constraining (power) relations between bodies and their patterning as inclusion-exclusion 
(identity). The argument is that human identity is emerging individually and collectively 
at the same time in the interaction, the experience of power relations, between human 
bodies. 
 
What people are doing, as they form figurations of power relations, or groups, is 
communicating with each other and this involves another opposition, namely, that of 
understanding and misunderstanding. The oppositions between, on the one hand, 
attachment / enabling / inclusion, and on the other hand, separation / constraining / 
exclusion, are reflected in the opposition of understanding and misunderstanding, 
transformed as communicative interaction. Mead has argued cogently that it is in 
communicative interaction that consciousness and self consciousness, the human 
individual and the human social, arise at the same time. 
 
 
Communicative interaction 
 
Mead (1934) says that humans have central nervous systems that enable them to take the 
attitude, meaning the tendency to act, of the other. When one person gestures to another, 
this gesture calls forth, or evokes, a response from that other. Meaning, or understanding, 
is not located simply in the gesture but also, at the same time, in the response. Together, 
gesture and response are inseparable phases in one social act. So, when one person shouts 
at another, this could call forth a response of counter shouting and the meaning may be 
aggression. However, the shout of one could call forth laughter from the other so that the 
meaning may be ridicule or contempt.  This continuous circular process of gesture and 
response is the social. A person can only be said to be conscious, if he is able to evoke in 
his own body a similar range of responses to those his gesture evokes in other bodies. 
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Only then can he potentially know what the meaning of his action might be. It is by 
engaging in a private role play with himself, just before, or while, he is gesturing that he 
can consciously choose his gestures in the light of the likely responses to them. 
Communication in language greatly enhances this capacity enabling the private role play 
to take on the form of silent conversation. Mind is this private role play / silent 
conversation, taking the form of gestures one directs to one’s own body, calling forth 
responses in one’s own body. Mind is the action of a body, a temporal process, and this 
concept of mind does not require the notion of representation or any notion of mind being 
inside anything. 
 
Mind and the social are thus the same processes of bodily action, the only difference is 
that mind is private-silent while the social is public-vocal. Human minds are not possible 
without human societies and human societies are not possible without human minds. 
They form and are formed by each other in the same processes of communicative 
interaction and it is in this action sense that the individual is social through and through. 
Consciousness is a reflexive, social phenomenon. However, there is nothing socially 
deterministic about this. The possibility of taking the attitude of the other is not a 
guarantee of getting it right. The possibility of understanding opened up by consciousness 
will always also be accompanied by the possibility of misunderstanding. Human 
interaction is, therefore, processes of negotiating meaning. 
 
Mead points out that self-consciousness is the capacity a subject has to take itself as an 
object to itself. As subject, ‘I’ can only be conscious of myself, that is, of ‘me’. As soon 
as the ‘I’ reflects itself, it is immediately ‘me’. This is Mead’s ‘I-me’ dialectic, the 
inseparable relationship between ‘I’ and ‘me’ which is self-consciousness. However, the 
‘me’ is the perceived gesture of the group / society to oneself as ‘I’. One can only be self-
conscious through taking the attitude, the tendency to act, of society to oneself. Self-
consciousness is, therefore, a fundamentally social process which cannot be located in an 
autonomous individual. However, this is not some form of social determinism because 
Mead stressed the capacity of the ‘I’, as response to the ‘me’, for spontaneity. The ‘I’ 
does not have a programmed response to the gesture of society but can respond in 
different and often surprising ways. Spontaneity here does not mean impulse, but a 
skilful, reflective capacity to choose different responses, developed in a life history of 
interaction. 
 
 
Generalisation in communicative interaction 
 
Mead makes it clear that conscious and self-conscious communicative interaction is not 
restricted to the present face-to-face interaction of those communicating with each other. 
Communicative interaction is a thematic, narrative pattern that is iterated in each present 
as both repetition and potential transformation through the spontaneity involved in self-
consciousness. In our interaction in the present, we are reproducing past patterns, 
although never in exactly the same way. I would link the possibility of such repetition to 
a central aspect of Mead’s theory, namely, the human tendency to generalise. As people 
interact with each other they do not simply take the attitude of the specific others they are 
 11
currently interacting with. They also take the attitude of what Mead calls the ‘generalised 
other’, at the same time. 
 
The generalised other is people in general in a group or society. Mead sometimes referred 
to this notion as taking the attitude of the game, the general way people interact in a 
particular kind of situation, such as exchanging goods on a market. In another 
formulation Mead (1938) referred to this notion as the ‘social object’. He contrasted a 
social object with a physical object. While the latter is to be found in nature as a thing, 
the social object is only to be found in the particular experience of interacting. The social 
object is not a thing but tendencies on the part of large numbers of people to act in similar 
ways in similar situations. We each acquire the attitude of the group, the generalised 
tendencies to act of those around us, the attitude of the game, in the history of our 
interaction with others from infancy to death. It is important to stress that such 
generalisations do not exist anywhere but are generalised tendencies to act which have to 
be continually particularised in the specific contingent situations we find ourselves in, 
over and over again. It is in this sense that every interaction is history dependent but not 
historically determined because in each situation spontaneous responses are possible. 
Indeed, the processes of particularising the general are bound to be conflictual and 
generate misunderstanding as we negotiate what the general means in particular 
contingent interactions. Furthermore, it is in this conflictual negotiation with each other 
that the further evolution of social objects emerges through the amplification of small 
differences in understanding and misunderstanding. In other words, the global patterns of 
the general are continually emerging and evolving in the many, many particular, local 
interactions between people. This is the human form of self organisation / emergence. 
 
If in every interaction with each other, members of a therapy group are making particular 
the attitude of the generalised other, the social object, the society, then focusing attention 
on individual intrapsychic processes, on childhood patterns and mother-infant 
relationships, will be highly limiting. The challenge for the therapist becomes one of 
participating in the group so as to widen and deepen communication through attending to 
the manner in which the generalised other, the social object, is being made particular in 
the group and the outside lives of group members. 
 
 
Idealisation and communicative interaction 
 
Mead (1923) also emphasised the capacity humans have for idealising their 
generalisations. He pointed to how people have a tendency to individualise and idealise a 
collective and treat it ‘as if’ it had overriding motives or values, amounting to a process 
in which the collective constitutes a ‘cult’. Members of ‘cults’ forget the ‘as if’ nature of 
their construct and act in a manner driven by the cult’s values. Cults are maintained when 
leaders present to people’s imagination a future free from obstacles that could prevent 
them from being what they all want to be, providing a feeling of enlarged personality in 
which individuals participate and from which they derive their value as persons and often 
justify the terrible actions they take. A ‘cult’ directly applies cult values as universal 
norms abstracted from daily life and individuals must conform unless they are to be 
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judged as selfish or sinful and excluded from the group. Cult values emerge in the 
historical evolution of any group or institution, to which they are ascribed, and they can 
be negative ideals but also positive ones, such as family values and democracy. It is 
important to stress this because one cult value could be ‘love thy neighbour’ and another 
could be ‘destroy unclean races’. What for one group is an idealisation is denigration for 
another. 
 
However, instead of being directly applied in a way that enforces the conformity of a 
cult, cult values can become functional values in the everyday interactions between 
people in a group. For example, the cult value of a hospital might be to ‘provide each 
patient with the best possible care’.  However, such a cult value has to be repeatedly 
functionalised in many unique specific situations throughout the day. As soon as cult 
values become functional values in real daily interaction, conflict arises and it is this 
conflict that must be negotiated by people in their practical interaction with each other 
(Griffin, 2002). 
 
What implication does this have for the practice of therapy? Once again, it shifts attention 
from the dyad and intrapsychic processes to the social processes of idealisation. As 
therapist, one is therefore encouraged to pay attention to such phenomena as they 
manifest in the group. These ideas might also provoke reflection on one’s own profession 
grouping. Do we form cults? How to we functionalise our cult values? 
 
Here, then we have another set of oppositions – generalising and particularising, 
idealising-denigrating and functionalising, transformed as social processes of conflict 
and negotiation. Understanding the role that generalisation / idealisation-denigration 
plays in human interaction is thus crucial. Generalising is a process of experiencing 
similarity and regularity in patterns of interaction in the present, that persist, usually over 
long time periods, as habit. But this is not simply habit because it involves an ongoing 
process of imaginatively constructing a sense of unity in experience, a matter to be taken 
up in the next section, which deals with choice and intention.  
 
 
Choice and evaluation 
 
People can choose their responses to others because they have the capacity for taking the 
attitude of others and such choice involves evaluation. The evaluative criteria for the 
choices people make are provided by norms and values and these too are social 
phenomena. 
 
Joas (2000) distinguishes between norms and values. For him, norms are criteria for 
judging desires and actions. They are obligatory and constraining criteria and so restrict 
opportunities for action. They are intimately connected with morals in that they provide 
criteria for what ought to be done, what is right. Elias (2000/1939) was particularly 
concerned with how norms emerge and evolve as people in a society become more and 
more interdependent and as the use of violence is monopolised by the state. He explained 
how desires are taken more and more behind the scenes of daily life as more detailed 
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norms emerge about what can and cannot be done in public. These norms become aspects 
of individual personality structures and adherence to such norms is sustained by the 
social process of shame. 
 
However, norms are inseparable, although different, from values. Joas draws on Dewey 
(1934) to argue that values are general and durable criteria for judging desires, norms and 
actions. Values are criteria that are attractive and compelling in a voluntary, committed 
sense. Values give life meaning and purpose, and so are not experienced as restrictive. 
They are the highest expression of our free will, presenting a paradox of compulsion and 
voluntary commitment at the same time. Values are inspiring motivations to act toward 
the good (ethics), which arise, and continue to be iterated, in particularly intense 
experiences of social interaction as inescapable aspects of self formation and self 
transcendence. Such experience takes hold of peoples’ imaginations and the experience is 
idealised in the imaginative construction of a ‘whole’ which does not exist and never will 
but which seems real because we have experienced it so intensely. This is not an illusion 
or a fantasy but, rather, the experience of value and value commitment. 
 
What ‘whole’ means here is the felt continuity and coherence, the felt unity, of 
experience.  Each individual is born into ongoing processes of human interaction in 
which the felt unity of generalisations / idealisations-denigrations, as imaginative 
‘wholes’, are iterated in each present as each individual learns throughout life, providing 
the basis of the values according to which they act. Values are not deliberate choices, 
indeed, they are experienced as not of our positing. Although values have general and 
durable qualities, their motivational impact on action must be negotiated afresh, must be 
particularised, in each action situation involving the spontaneous discrimination of the 
‘I’. It follows that values are contingent upon the particular action situations in which we 
find ourselves.  
 
The basis of individual choices, from this perspective, is thus fundamentally social. The 
criteria for evaluation are, at the same time, both obligatory restrictions taking the form 
of what ought and ought not to be done (norms) and voluntary compulsions, taking the 
form of what it is good to do (values). Emotions, such as shame and fear of punishment 
or exclusion, provide the main constraining force with regard to norms, while feelings of 
being recognised and feeling worthy act as positive reinforcers.  Emotions such as 
gratitude, humility, altruism, guilt and feelings of self worth provide the voluntary, 
compelling force of value experiences, as does hatred and contempt for other groups. 
 
While the separation of values and norms is an aid to understanding, it is an abstraction 
from lived, practical experience in which they are inseparable aspects of the criteria for 
choosing actions. Together, norms and values constitute ideology, which emerges and 
continues to evolve in the very same bodily interactions that constitute the social and the 
self at the same time. Both norms and values, as criteria for choosing actions, form and 
are formed by the self which forms and is formed by the social, all at the same time. 
Again, we have an opposition, this time of voluntary compulsion and obligatory 
restriction transformed as ideology. 
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However, there is no such thing as the autonomous individual or purely individual 
choice, simply because humans are interdependent. Instead, there is the interplay of 
individual choices and this means that individuals must continually negotiate and adjust 
the choices they are making in a particular situation, that is, with a particular group of 
people in a particular place at a particular time. By the interplay of choices, then, I mean 
a necessarily contingent, conflictual negotiation of differences in which the general / 
ideal-denigrated is made particular. This involves individual spontaneity and the potential 
for the amplification of differences, and thus the evolution of identity. Narrative patterns 
of experience, including norms-values-ideologies, as well as the outcomes of actions, all 
emerge in the interplay of choices in local interactions.  
 
A shift to this way of thinking has implications for therapeutic practice. It encourages the 
therapist to focus attention on the norms, values and ideologies of the wider society as 
they manifest in group interaction. It also encourages communities of therapeutic 
practitioners to reflect together on their own norms, values and ideologies and the impact 
these have on their practice. 
 
 
Threats to identity and the consequences of anxiety 
 
I have used the word normally in the above description in order to signal that there is 
nothing inevitable or determined about the interplay of human choices in processes of 
particularising generalisations and idealisations-denigrations. Furthermore, as already 
mentioned, sometimes the interplay of choices does not take the form of particularisation. 
The reason for this has to do with anxiety. The normal processes of particularising are 
blocked when threats of destruction / fragmentation to individual-collective identities 
prompt existential anxiety and fears of exclusion and separation. The unconscious 
response is to strengthen ties of attachment and inclusion to preserve identity. 
Furthermore, the process of communication inevitable involves misunderstanding, the 
process of power relating inevitable involves exclusion and the process of particularising 
the generalisation / idealisation-denigration inevitably involves conflict. All of these are 
existential threats to identity, and thus human survival, and so are bound to arouse 
anxiety. 
 
An immediate response to such anxiety is obviously aggression but, perhaps less 
obviously, an unconscious pressure for homogenisation and conformity to the group from 
which people derive their identities. This amounts to rigidly applying ideological 
‘wholes’ to contingent interaction. If people in a group rigidly apply the ideological 
‘whole’ to their interactions in all specific, contingent situations they co-create fascist 
power relations and cults, characterised by collective ecstasies, and high levels of 
dependency and aggression, which alienate people from their ordinary everyday 
experience. Alternatively, if the ideological ‘whole’ is so fragmented that there is little 
generalised tendency to act, then people will be interacting in ways that are almost 
entirely contingent on the situation, resulting in anarchy. The consequence is that further 
evolution is blocked in both cases. However, when people particularise / functionalise 
some ideological ‘wholes’ in contingent situations, a conflictual process of negating the 
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whole, then further evolution is possible. Such particularisation always involves critical 
reflection, richer and deeper communication, and the spontaneity in which differences 
can be amplified. But they are all processes that are particularly uncomfortable and so 
quickly arouse existential anxiety which can easily block evolution. The practical 
implication is to notice the wider dimensions of anxiety. Rigid, neurotic behaviour may 
then come to be understood as reposes to threats to identity, for example, when people 
are evicted from the organisation they belong to. 
 
Now consider how one might think about both very large groups, crowds, and small 
groups from this perspective. 
 
 
The crowd and the ‘group-as-a-whole’ 
 
Increasing numbers make it more difficult for people to negotiate differences so that the 
processes of particularisation become more and more difficult, eventually impossible. 
The interplay of interdependent individual choices then becomes characterised by the 
process of direct application of the imaginative ‘wholes’ of generalisations and 
idealisations-denigrations. It is not that people have lost their autonomy since they were 
not autonomous in the first place. It is not that they have lost their individuality, but 
rather, that in the experience of being in a crowd, interdependent individuals have no 
other way of going on together than unconsciously choosing actions in conformity with 
an imaginative ‘whole’. A crowd is akin to a temporary cult with a fascist power 
structure. Now we cannot say that this automatically, of itself, is either good or bad, 
mature of primitive, only that it is an intense experience of value. There will be different 
views on whether a particular incidence of crowd behaviour is good or bad, mature or 
regressed. All we can say is that the crowd is a potentially volatile experience because the 
constraints provided by particularisation are largely absent. 
 
For example, the crowd of nearly one million people who took to the streets of London in 
early 2001 to protest against the Iraq war cannot sensibly be understood as a group of 
people who had regressed to a primitive state in which they had lost their individuality. I 
argue that this crowd is more sensibly understood as an expression of a very intense 
experience of value, which they and a great many others would judge to be good. 
However, crowds leaving a football ground and going on a rampage of violence and 
looting, could also be said to be engaged in an intense experience of value in which they 
are pitting one team, one imaginative ‘whole’ against another. Most people would regard 
an experience of value involving violence as bad.  But I cannot see, even here, how it aids 
understanding to regard this as regression to the primitive in which individuality is lost. 
All members of this crowd, even as they participate in its actions, are still members of an 
advanced modern society, who have individual responsibility for what they are doing. 
Most football spectators do not engage in this behaviour even though they may be caught 
up in the crowd. Furthermore, violence does not break out in every crowd leaving a 
football match. There is nothing inevitably bad or primitive about a football crowd. For 
both the demonstration and the football cases, I would not understand the crowd as an 
individual writ large and crowd behaviour in terms of intrapsychic processes of 
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projection and regression, or as contagion or ecstasy. Instead, I understand a crowd as a 
social phenomenon where the interplay of individual choices takes the form of direct 
application of generalisations / idealisations-denigrations rather than the form of 
particularisation. 
 
From a complex responsive processes perspective, one thinks about the small group in 
much the same way. When, for example, a group-analytic therapist assesses a number of 
people and invites some of them to become members of her therapy group, she is taking 
up in her interactions with them a social object, that is, generalised tendencies to act, and 
an idealisation, or cult value, known as group analysis, particularising them in specific 
assessment situations. When members of the group assemble for their first meeting they 
interact in a manner characterised by some degree of empathy/attunement in their face-to-
face interaction with each other and, at the same time, by the particularising of the 
generalisations / idealisations-denigrations of the various other groups and of the society 
they belong to. As they do so, thematic patterns of communication and power relations 
emerge that organise their experience of being together. They develop a narrative history 
of being together. Normally, they fairly rapidly develop an experience of belonging to 
that specific group in which they begin to generalise the therapeutic, or otherwise, 
patterns of their interaction. They begin to feel a continuity and unity in their experience, 
the imaginative construction of a ‘whole’, which they may feel to be not of their own 
positing even though it is they who are socially constructing it. Frequently, they come to 
idealise and denigrate this imaginative construct and perhaps even ascribe to it some 
imaginative form of ‘agency’. They may even come to feel that ‘it’ has a mind of its own. 
The key point is that this imaginative construct is neither an illusion nor a reality in a 
naturalistic sense; rather, it is a social object, even a cult value. Normally members 
particularise, in each session, this social object or cult value. 
 
However, when threats to identity, frightening conflicts and fears of exclusion arise, they 
experience heightened feelings of anxiety. This leads to the obliteration of differences, to 
homogenisation, which blocks the processes of particularisation with the result that the 
imaginative ‘whole’ is taken up in their interactions in a rigid manner and experienced as 
an agency. The group then takes on characteristics akin to a fascist power structure and 
cult with its powerful pressure for conformity. The thematic patterning of interaction may 
then take the form of scapegoating nonconformists, uniting against denigrated external 
enemies, dependency on an idealised leader. In other words, the patterns of interaction 
take the form of what Bion called basic assumptions, except now they are understood not 
as pathological intrapsychic processes writ large, as regression to primitive psychic 
states, but as normal social responses to anxiety which may sometimes be highly 
destructive and truly horrendous. They are not understood in terms of an external system 
which is making people powerless but as a co-construction for which members must take 
responsibility. What they need to take responsibility for is the rigid patterns of power and 
value which they are co-creating. 
 
Does this difference in explanation matter as far as the work of the therapist is 
concerned? I argue that the explanation one has in mind as one works as therapist does 
have an effect on how one participates in the group. From the complex responsive 
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processes perspective, the therapist cannot be other than a fully participating member of 
the group. The therapist may think he is not a full participant and may act in a withdrawn 
manner, thinking of himself as operating from the ‘boundary’. However, this is a form of 
full participation evoking responses from others just as any other form of participation 
does. The responses will be different to those evoked by other modes of participation but 
they are not different in kind. This does not mean that all members are the same. No 
member will participate in exactly the same way as any other. In a sense, each member 
takes up a somewhat different role in the group and the pattern of power relations is tilted 
toward some and away from others, although this will vary over time. The therapist takes 
a particular role, which involves not contributing his life story or current activities outside 
the group but rather pays undivided attention to the other members. By virtue of 
professional training and having assembled the group, the therapist finds the power ratio 
tilted towards him and this is exacerbated by the particular role he takes up. However, 
this is, nevertheless, not a difference in kind and it is an illusion to imagine that one is at 
some ‘boundary’ or operating as a ‘container’ of anxiety. 
 
Instead, in accordance with the group-analytic approach, the therapist understands her 
role as that of facilitating communication in the group, in Foulkes’ words, ‘widening and 
deepening communication’. I would argue that in order to do this, the therapist draws 
attention to the general thematic patterns that seem to be emerging in the interaction 
between members and particularly to the differences in the ways members are forming 
and being formed by these patterns. The therapist is seeking to draw attention to the 
particularising, in the living present, of the generalisations / idealisations-denigrations 
being iterated. The purpose is to try to amplify the differences as the means of enriching 
communication and of shifting rigid (neurotic) patterns of interaction. This amounts to 
working on the basis that any sense of continuity and unity in experience, any sense of 
the imaginative ‘whole’, is only to be found in its particularisation in the living present. 
This means that one focuses attention on the actual patterns of interaction that people are 
engaging in. 
 
From this perspective, the therapist avoids interpretations to do with the generalisation, 
the imaginative ‘whole’, because they may well reinforce the feeling of some ‘agency’ 
beyond members’ own positing that is acting upon them, so relieving them of taking 
responsibility for what they are doing. Instead, the therapist is encouraging himself and 
others to reflect on just how they are taking up generalisations and cult values in their 
interaction, seeking always to amplify differences. The aim is to encourage members to 
take responsibility for what they are co-creating, individually and collectively. If 
heightened anxiety is being reflected in the suppression of difference in cult-like 
conformity, the work of the therapist is to point to this. The therapist is negating, or 
deconstructing, any experience of a ‘whole’. 
 
When making ‘group-as-a-whole’ interpretations, that is, hypothesising projected 
intrapsychic processes, the therapist can easily appear as an expert on ‘the unconscious’ 
and so exacerbate already large power differences and increase unhelpful dependency, 
which can infantilise and even confuse members. In my experience of being at the 
receiving end of them, ‘group-as-a-whole’ interpretations help to create a rather 
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mysterious sense of an actual agency with the potential for sustaining cult-like 
interactions. My experience of being in groups where the therapist / consultant adheres 
strictly to ‘group-as-a-whole’ interpretations, often sounding highly fanciful to my ears, 
is one of being caught up in a rather mysterious, cultish activity. Any attempt at 
countering this is interpreted as denial or resistance, trapping one into conforming to the 
interpretation. From the perspective I am suggesting, the role of the group therapist is to 
actively question and undermine such modes of participation.  
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